000 such provisional unions are unnecessary. Moreover, professional
548 prostitution is for this reason virtually unknown in Urundi (see
also p. 218). I do not know whether the Barundi have "women's
575 clubs" with an organization of their own; in any case, there are
no special women's houses.

2. Birth, Childhood, Puberty, Death

163 As far as the Bahutu are concerned, the Barundi are a
people with a high birthrate. This is less true of the Batussi,
probably as a result of the long period of inbreeding. The more
842 children there are in a family, the greater is the work force
available to the parents and the better are the prospects of
obtaining a good purchase price for the girls who are to be
[832] married. Husband and wife occasionally take aphrodisiacs of
herb juices in order to increase fecundity (No. 19, p. 359).
As soon as the wife has conceived, the medicine man (umufumu)
843 is called. He gives her amulets to protect the embryo from
751 evil spirits. The amulets are worn over the abdomen which is
particularly in need of protection. For the same purpose the
husband occasionally blows tobacco smoke at his wife.

Whenever the results of conception are to be avoided,
847 either for the convenience of the women or in order to remove
the results of illicit intercourse, artificial abortion (kukorora) is
induced by intensive massage and by taking certain infusions
made of herbs. The use of these methods is a kind of secret
science among the women, and the men do not appear to have
any knowledge of it. The application of these methods is con-
[673] sidered a criminal offense and is punished [110] by the head
man or the chief (No. 19, p. 62). On the other hand, in
Ussumbwa and Unjamwesi abortion by means of herbal decoctions
is extremely widespread. "It is the goal of Barundi couples to
854 have as many children as possible. One frequently sees fathers
tending, carrying, and feeding their children in Urundi but
000 never in Ussumbwa or in Unjamwesi. Barrenness (ingumba) is

4: Maquet E-5 (1950-1951) 1954 FO42 Rundi FO42

who steal cattle, or set fire to huts, or commit adultery are punished by the political or family authorities. Social sanctions are not only physically enforced penalties, such as corporal punishment and compensations, but also the unorganized reactions of the people who know the delinquent: kin, neighbours, clients, and lord. For the Batutsi, for whom reputation stands high in the scale of values, this is extremely important. According to our informants, the fear of being considered a man without loyalty or without dignity, the dread of being despised by one's family, prevent many breaches of rules. To use Kluckhohn's terminology, we may say that Ruanda's is a shame-culture. But it is also a guilt-culture. When a Munyarwanda has transgressed some rule so secretly that there is not the slightest chance of his being found out and incurring punishment and shame, he nevertheless feels guilty and knows, our informants told us, that his action is bad. When a child has disobeyed his father without the latter's knowledge, he thinks not only of the unpleasant consequences that the discovery of his misbehaviour might produce but also (and some informants say 'mainly') of the wickedness of the act itself. The Ruanda word for conscience, *kamera*, means something that is internally felt. It is situated in the heart.

That the Banyarwanda have a 'conscience' will not be rated as a great discovery by some. But since some recent studies, such as Kluckhohn's on the Navaho, have stressed the fact that, in some cultures, submission to rules seems to be realized almost entirely through a rational concern to avoid punishment or shame, it does not seem superfluous to consider how far observance of rules is, or is not, linked to ethical principles and feelings of guilt.

Let us now attempt to indicate more precisely how moral wrong is conceived in the Ruanda culture. As has been already mentioned, *Imana* is not the guardian of the moral order. Sometimes he seems to be regarded as its author in the sense that he might have decided that men should not steal; but it is clear that when a man steals another man's cows, *Imana* is not personally offended. Those who are offended are those who have been wronged by the action, or those who had issued an order which has been disobeyed. When *Imana* has not been directly injured (as by blasphemies), or when the injury done to another has not been specifically forbidden by him, he is not thought to be offended. The victim could, however, ask *Imana* to punish the wrongdoer and if he then became ill, it would be said that *Imana* had punished him.

The other agencies of the supernatural world have even slighter relations with ethical values. The *bazimu* are naturally malevolent and punish only those actions which they take to be directed against themselves. A way to honour the spirit of somebody who had been a thief during his life was to simulate a robbery. *Ryangombe* and his fellows were not models of morality during their earthly existence and, they did not care about the ethics of their followers. Nor was there any punishment after death. For those who believe that there are two kinds of life after death—happy or unhappy—the

4: Maquet E-5 (1950-1951) 1954 FO42 Rundi FO42

qualification for the happy one is not to live a blameless life on earth, but to undergo initiation into the *Ryangombe* cult.

Thus the ethics of the Banyarwanda are not integrated on a religious basis such as the will of God. What is the principle of integration, or rather, we should first ask, are their ethical conceptions integrated? On the surface they consist, like any moral code, of a multiplicity of prohibitions, orders, and exhortations. Have they achieved a synthesis of these separate elements by reducing the multiplicity to one or a few principles? Or, what amounts to the same thing, could they give a definition of good and evil?

In Ruanda a great number of particular rules are subsumed under general principles such as: do not do what is harmful to people of your group or of your country; do what people related to you would like; submit to your superiors. Principles such as these are already on a higher level of abstraction than the particular rules. When informants are asked to account for a given rule or principle they give as the final justification: 'It has always been done that way in Ruanda.' We may perhaps express the Ruanda definition of good and evil in these terms: That is good (or evil) which tradition has defined as good (or evil).

Tradition is indeed a powerful force in cultures which, as in Ruanda, have been isolated for centuries from world currents. Each generation is more conscious of the importance of what it has received from the preceding one than is possible when much of what constitutes its way of life comes not from its ancestors but from some other social tradition. Moreover, their relations with their neighbours whom they frequently subjugated have persuaded Banyarwanda of the excellence of the ways of life transmitted by their forefathers. In such a situation the traditional character of a rule appears to be sufficient justification. If the ancestors, who were so wise, behaved in that way it would be preposterous to question it.

But it would be misleading to picture the Banyarwanda as following blindly the moral rules framed in a remote past without having any idea of their purpose. Some old men have a clear understanding of the social significance of certain rules. They explained, for example, that the duality of the rules concerning adultery committed by the husband or by the wife was accounted for by the importance of the wife's function in procreation. She has thus a greater responsibility than the husband for maintaining the integrity of the family.

Does this kind of thinking extend so far as independence of tradition? Some informants told us that, apart from the authority of custom, some actions were thought of as dishonourable in themselves. But these informants were Christians and, apparently, very much influenced by their religion. Moreover, they could not quote a clear case of conflict between tradition and ethics.

No moral code can achieve an absolute character in all its precepts. Prohibitions and commands frequently relate only to certain categories of persons and situations. Even the Christian Western ethic, which realizes to

4: Maquet E-5 (1950-1951) 1954 FO42 Rundi FO42

a very considerable extent universality and absoluteness, qualifies some of its commanda. The degree of absoluteness and universality of the Ruanda rules of conduct is much lower. We might say that most of its precepts are qualified in relation to persons and circumstances. To steal cattle was forbidden, but a Mututsi could take the cattle of a Muhutu who had no lord. For a Muhutu to rob a foreigner was not forbidden. A wife might not commit adultery, but she was allowed to have sexual relations with people when ordered by her husband to do so and, even without her husband's permission, a woman could have intercourse with her husband's brothers and parallel cousins. Killing a man was prohibited, but not if he was an enemy of Ruanda or of the family, and if the feud had not been barred by the king. Banyarwanda certainly had no idea of rules of behaviour applicable to all men in virtue of their common humanity. This is perfectly consistent with the Ruanda conception of mankind and the very significant inequalities which Banyarwanda observe between themselves and neighbouring peoples and, among themselves, between the different castes.

To conclude, the rules of human action which prohibit or enjoin the use of certain means in order to achieve the culturally recognized values of Ruanda are sanctioned, not only by organized and unorganized social reactions but also by individual conscience or guilt feelings. The foundation of this moral code is not religious or supernatural but traditional; its content is a multiplicity of rules synthesized under a few moral principles. Particular precepts do not have a universal application but are relative to persons and groups.

Human Relations

Two principles dominate the field of human relations in Ruanda: inequality of men and indefinite reciprocity.

For the Banyarwanda all men have indeed a common nature; they are ultimately the descendants of the same ancestor. But this notion does not seem to be very significant, for Banyarwanda are much more impressed by the differences displayed by the various castes. The characteristics of these castes are stereotyped and repeated in many folk-tales. Batutsi are intelligent (in the sense of astute in political intrigues), apt to command, refined, courageous, and cruel. Bahutu are hard-working, not very clever, extrovert, irascible, unmannerly, obedient, physically strong. Batwa are gluttonous, loyal to their Batutsi masters, lazy, courageous when hunting, lacking in restraint. These characteristics, with differences in stress and shading, are generally recognized by all Banyarwanda. As they reflect the Mututsi point of view, it appears that the superior caste has been able to make other people see themselves in important respects as Batutsi see them. Moreover, those qualities are considered to be innate, not acquired. A Mututsi is born clever and a Muhutu impulsive. Some tales, more widely known than those concerning the creation of man, relate how the first Batutsi came to Ruanda

8: Hall G-5 (1929-31) 1938 FO42 Rundi FO42

An instance which shows a number of these possibilities comes from the court book of Bugufi, a chiefdom in the north-west of Tanganyika Territory. A custom which might or might not be noted by the ethnographer—something must escape the most meticulous of observers, and this one is not recorded by Meyer for the Barundi, of whom the people of Bugufi are ethnologically part—is the right of the chief to pasture his cattle among the millet-stalks after the harvest, before the peasant may put in his own cattle or any which he is herding for some one else. The court book records eight peasants coming to court to complain against a Tusi who has driven off their cattle. The Tusi replies that the men had pastured their cattle in their millet before the chief had had access. Asked by the court whether he was instructed to drive off the cattle, the Tusi replies that he acted as he was bound to do in accordance with ancient custom and his obligations to the chief. New concepts have, however, found their way into the court, which gives judgement for the plaintiffs on the grounds that the land and the cattle were theirs. This case is exceptional in the wealth of statement and suggestion which it offers, but there are many others helpful in lesser degree.

The value of native court records in this way was brought home to me while stationed in this area, Bugufi, during the years 1929–31, when I went through the available material with a view to seeing what were the normal causes of litigation and getting a general idea of the law administered. Starting with the year 1924, the series was examined up to the end of 1930. For these seven years, 850 cases were found where judgement issued, there being a further 225 which had been settled out of court or dismissed for want of prosecution or by reason of limitation. Of these 850 cases, almost one-quarter concerned contracts where cattle were involved, nearly one-sixth were marital cases, and another sixth were over administrative matters, including offences against the Native Authority Ordinance: only one-seventh were of offences against person and property, and the remainder concerned debts, land, inheritance, damage to property and a few miscellaneous matters.

The fullest records were those of the numerous marital cases, and these have been fully collated with a view to giving an idea of how much information can be gleaned and what gaps remain, and what

10:Albert E-5 (1956-1957)1963
FO42 Rundi FO42

mother how to farm and to carry burdens on their heads. At 12, boys and girls should be able to work well and independently. If not, they are beaten or deprived of their dinner to encourage them to learn. There is, nevertheless, time to play with other children, the boys with other boys, the girls with other girls.

Moral taboos have no significance before adolescence. Children may eat anything at all, without penalty. A young girl may milk a cow: she is not yet a woman, say the Rundi, she is still like her brother. Brothers and sisters sleep together in the same bed and are covered by the same mat. If sometimes there are sexual experiments, these are not called incest. They are only children, they are not responsible, they cannot sin. At puberty, a young girl is removed from the common bedroom of the children. Boys seem to mature much later than girls. Moreover, the question of the dowry enters to delay their marriage. It is said that girls want to be married very early. By the time they have reached puberty, they have already begun to play with other young girls, each helping the other to develop the private parts to a maximum size in anticipation of the pleasures of the marriage bed. A mother warns her daughter that she must absolutely remain a virgin until her marriage, or, at least, that she does not dare to become pregnant if she has not yet been asked for and paid for. In the past, an unmarried mother-to-be would have been killed and her father's property confiscated. Today, there are illegitimate children, and nobody knows quite what to do with them. (One way in which a disgruntled wife can revenge herself upon her husband is by allowing a grown daughter to become pregnant before she is paid for.) At all events, it is up to the mother of a nubile daughter to watch her carefully.

Very strong taboos forbid all contact between a father and his daughter after she has been weaned, except for mutual greetings and for several minor services which a daughter performs for her father.[13] It is customary for girls to wear only a skirt while working, and in the past, a young girl might wear nothing at all or only a leopard skin around her hips. A father must avert his eyes if a daughter is working with her bosom exposed. If a father wishes some information about his daughter, or if he wishes to say something to her, he must ask his wife to speak to their daughter. If a young girl is to be punished, it is the mother who will beat her, never the father. The same taboos apply to the father's brothers. All are called *data*, father. Fathers never enter the house in which a married daughter lives with her husband. The explanation offered for these strong taboos to separate father from mature